Why do some banks fail in financial crises while others survive? This article answers this question by analysing the effect of the Dutch financial crisis of the 1920s on 142 banks, of which 33 failed.
Introduction
The Dutch economy suffered a sharp recession in the early 1920s after it had experienced a period of exceptional performance in the 1910s. Following Fisher's (1933) debt-deflation theory of great depressions, Jonker and Van Zanden (1995) argue that this recession's principal cause was overindebtedness combined with price deflation. Dutch businesses had benefited greatly from the First World War, a conflict in which the Netherlands remained neutral ; a short post-war boom prolonged their prosperity (Van Zanden, 1997a) . The large and sustained declines in aggregate demand and prices that followed were the consequence of falling export demand and monetary policy due to the gold standard. Debt-deflation put pressure both on Dutch businesses and on the banking sector that they had come to rely on. Instability for banks has since been widely classified as constituting a financial crisis (e.g. Bernanke and James, 1991; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009 ). Jonker and Van Zanden (1995) estimate that 35 banks suffered financial distress in this crisis; De Vries (1989) puts the number closer to 70. Of the 142 banks considered in this article, which together constitute 83 per cent of the nominal equity value of the Dutch financial services sector, we document 33 that suffered distress at some stage in the crisis.
This article quantitatively investigates the determinants of this unequalled bank distress in the Netherlands by using discrete choice models to "predict the past". Bank-level financial accounting, product market competition and board data included in popular contemporary investor manuals are used to assess how policy decisions influenced banks' fate. In particular, we ask how banks' choices made before the debt-deflationary downturn affected their subsequent performance in the banking crisis. This article complements De Vries (1989) and Jonker and Van Zanden (1995) by systematically distinguishing between the characteristics of distressed and non-distressed banks. As such, this article adds a new and more nuanced understanding of this period in Dutch economic history. Though we agree that the crisis of the 1920s was caused by extensive deflationary pressures, our methodology shows that its consequences for the country's financial service providers stem from bank-specific risk factors, including the characteristics of their relationships with other banks and non-financial firms.
While our main goal is to shed new light on an unresolved historical question, finding an answer to the role of pre-crisis conditions for crisis-period performance is interesting for three further reasons: (1) it facilitates the economic identification of the roots of bank distress because its causes were largely exogenous, but its effects on the banking sector were partly determined endogenously;
(2) because of the absence of prudential supervision in the Netherlands at the time of the crisis, this historical episode illustrates how banks may behave when there is little expectation of state intervention; and (3) it provides a better understanding of product market competitive choice and the workings of relationship banking in times of crisis.
The methodology we employ follows work which uses discrete choice models to determine why banks fail (Kolari et al., 2002; Ravi Kumar and Ravi, 2007) . Following Meyer and Pifer (1970) , Martin (1977) , and Pettaway and Sinkey (1980), we use bank-level accounting data to measure capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings and liquidity. Our data on the determinants of failure are taken from 1917, while the failures start in 1920. This implies that all decisions were taken in 1917 or earlier, but the crisis was caused by the troubles the banks' clients and business connections faced in 1920 and later. All banks in our sample -failing or not -were confronted with the same economic conditions, but not all banks failed. Our empirical strategy explores the possibility that failing banks made bad lending and financing decisions up to 1917 and suffered their consequences in the 1920s.
In other words, we document bad policy decisions, conditional on changing economic circumstances.
Although the precise developments after 1917 were not foreseeable for the bankers, those making good decisions anticipated a worsening of conditions.
In this article we take a broad view of bank distress. We include many of the standard balance sheet-based and control variables found in the literature on banking crises. The Dutch financial sector was highly fragmented at the time of the crisis and the banks in our sample exhibit wide variation in their product market choices and positioning. We incorporate variables which describe market structure and the presence of international activities in order to measure these effects.
Descriptions of the Dutch financial services sector in this period suggest that bank directors were positioned strategically on the boards of related financial and non-financial corporations with the explicit task of safeguarding their employers' interests (e.g. De Graaf, 2012) . We use information from banks' boards, and in particular their networks of interlocking directorates, to explore the impact of a form of relationship banking that emerged in the Netherlands in the 1910s.
Our results are as follows. We find that the balance sheet composition of banks before the crisis period had a significant impact on their probability of suffering distress in the 1920s. In particular, banks with higher leverage and more deposits were at greater risk of suffering distress.
Much in line with the established view of this crisis, we attribute this to the combined exposure to debt-deflation -which rendered long-term loans riskier -and the post-war boom that came immediately before it -which caused a short-lived banking bubble. We find that younger and exchange-listed banks were more vulnerable in times of crisis.
The effects of banks' product market strategies and competition are mixed. On the one hand banks with branches and international activities were more likely to suffer distress. We take this to be evidence of the risk of doing business further away from banks' headquarters, a strategy which is associated with higher monitoring costs. On the other hand, we find no effect of competition, measured as the relative market representation over the regions where a bank is active in the domestic market.
In exploring how interlocking directorates influence banks' performance, we find that banks with smaller boards had a higher probability of suffering distress. When we control for the effects of board size and the attributes of interlocking directorates, we find evidence for the interdependency of the Netherlands' banks. In particular, banks which positioned their managerial connections in other financial firms that were smaller and highly profitable immediately prior to the crisis were most at risk. We find that interlocks with non-financial firms had a weak impact on the probability of suffering distress; we find only that banks which concentrated such interlocks were better able to safeguard their interests during the crisis.
The findings of this article relate to a wider literature on universal or relationship banking in the early twentieth century, in particular to Fohlin (1999) for the case of Germany and to Van Overfelt et al. (2009) for the case of Belgium. More specifically, we re-examine the problems associated with mixed banking in the crises of the interwar period, much as White (1986) and Kroszner and Rajan (1994) do for the case of the US.
Our results relate to an already existing body of work on the Dutch crisis of the 1920s. De Vries (1989) gives a detailed historical narrative of its unfolding from the perspective of De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), the Netherlands' bank of issue. Jonker (1989 Jonker ( , 1991 argues that close ties between bankers and their corporate borrowers via interlocking directorates soon extended the crisis from the non-financial to the financial sector. Colvin (2014) describes how conflicts of interest arising from one such interlock resulted in the near failure of the country's second-largest bank. We find that the crisis was mainly caused by the internal choices made by banks in terms of financial structure (leverage and deposits) and product market strategy (branching and internationalization), as well as by the relations between banks.
This article is closely related to various other works in banking and finance. Most importantly, it relates to work on the causes and consequences of financial crises -a theme which, given recent bank failures, has lately been revived (for a review, see Acharya et al., 2009; and Lo, 2012) . Of specific relevance in this literature are two studies which, like ours, attempt to "predict the past": Jordan et al. (2010) , who, on the basis of data pertaining to banks one year prior to the 2007 crisis, predict recent bank failures with 88 per cent accuracy; and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) , who find that there is a general persistence in banks' risk-taking culture between 1998 and the present which renders their performance very sensitive to crises.
The article proceeds as follows. First, the historical and institutional context necessary to understand our arguments is introduced in Section 2. Our bank-level accounting and corporate governance data and the empirical strategy used in the analysis are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 defines the variables constructed for our regression exercises and presents their descriptive statistics, and Section 5 discusses the results of our regression models for bank failure. Section 6 concludes by assessing the importance of a bank's policy decisions, in terms of balance sheet composition and interlocking directorates, for its performance during a deflationary recession.
Historical and institutional context
At the turn of last century, the Netherlands' banks played second fiddle to the country's capital markets. Commercial banks were nothing like those in neighbouring Germany (Fohlin, 2007) .
Indeed, the Netherlands went in very little for banking: 64 per cent of the kingdom's money supply on the eve of the First World War was in the form of paper money, versus 37 per cent in Germany, 29 per cent in Belgium and just 4 per cent in Britain (Van Zanden, 1997b) . Jonker (2002) argues that the Netherlands had not produced banks because its sophisticated financial inheritance could do without them. Amsterdam's merchants had developed a flexible credit source called prolongatie, a short-term credit instrument which demanded financial securities -primarily exchange-listed shares -as collateral. This highly liquid on-call money market, which operated in a similar way to modern repurchase agreements (repos), was unique to the Netherlands and outcompeted banks on cost. It enabled firms to meet both short-term and long-term credit requirements, since the instrument could be easily rolled over.
From about 1911, and in particular during the First World War, the country started to look more like a bank-based economy. A wave of bank mergers had built sophisticated multi-branch networks with a wide portfolio of clients (Jonker, 1995) . The prolongatie market gave way to bank finance when Amsterdam's stock exchange closed in 1914 due to the outbreak of war (De Vries, 1976) . 1 The war itself and the subsequent short post-war economic boom hastened the move by banks to widen their services; they now took a direct part in industrial ventures, not merely bringing them to market. The regulatory regime at the time remained laissez faire: the absence of corporate laws specifically governing banking corporations enabled them to engage in a variety of different business activities, including investment banking, without being inhibited by minimum bank capitalisation requirements, or constrained by specific shareholder liability rules. Moreover, the country lacked a modern central bank; while DNB as the bank of issue monopolised the printing of paper money, it remained a private business answerable to private shareholders, had no formal duty of regulatory oversight and neither a de facto nor a de jure function as a lender of last resort in crises (Jonker, 1996) .
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By tradition, Dutch firms employed a dual board structure similar to the German model, with a management board made up of directeuren (executive directors) and a supervisory board of commissarissen (non-executive directors).
3 Jonker (1989 Jonker ( , 1991 uses the number of interlocks between banks and industry to measure financial development, or banking scope. He argues that an increase in interlocks suggests a move towards universal service provision, where banks simultaneously do business as both commercial and investment banks, since banks install directors in the firms which they finance. He argues that bankers sitting on the boards of multiple firms positioned themselves as "bearers of capitalism", able to control the trajectory of the country's economic development. 4 He finds that in the early 1920s interlocks more than doubled, from 200 in 2 However, DNB did supervise the banking sector in three informal ways: (1) its governors were sent news of changes in the board composition of all Dutch financial institutions; (2) like other shareholder-owned banks, it actively participated in the corporate policy formation of other firms by parachuting its directors onto the boards of corporate clients; and (3) it could choose the financial terms for its short-term debt instrument, access to its bill rediscounting facility. The last was especially controversial at the time; some private banks complained that it was abusing its position as the Dutch state's bank of issue by allegedly offering loans at terms that no other bank could match (Communication between the director of the Bond Geld-en Effectenhandel and the Minister of Finance, December 1917, Archief van de Bond voor de Geld-en Effectenhandel te 's-Gravenhage, Access No. 2.19.042.14, Nationaal Archief, The Hague).
3 Members of both boards were normally appointed at shareholders' meetings on the advice of sitting directeuren (De Jong and Röell, 2005) ; as a rule, their appointment could be assumed. 4 Jonker revisits earlier notions of the relevance of interlocking directorates put forward by Wibaut (1913) , who argues that the Netherlands' largest banks were gradually starting to dominate the economy by buying equity stakes in 1920 to 431 in 1923. Many of these were due to changes at the Netherlands' second-largest bank, the and banks for small-scale urban enterprises (middenstandsbanken) were emerging with the turn of the century. 9 In addition a handful of overseas banks operated as free-standing companies servicing firms in the Dutch colonies and elsewhere. Branching was a relatively new strategy for Dutch banks;
about 70 per cent of the banks in our sample were unit-independent on the eve of the 1920s crisis.
industry and increasing credit supply. Wibaut saw this as a conscious strategy by the bankers to strive for hegemony, which led to a prominent role for them in the decision making process of industrial firms.
5 This was described on the eve of the crisis by the son of Robaver's president as part of an expansionary strategy to emulate Germany's universal banks (Westerman, 1920) . 6 Most interlocks were between the supervisory boards of banks and non-financial firms (47 per cent), but a substantial portion involved a directeur of a bank sitting as a commissaris of a non-financial firm (29 per cent). 9 A separate analysis of cooperative banks can be found in Colvin (2011) and Colvin and McLaughlin (2014) . Between 1920 and 1924 , De Vries (1989 counts the (near-) failure of at least four algemene banken (including Robaver), 26 provincial banks and two overseas ones. He estimates that at least 200 million guilders was lost between 1920 and 1922, a figure largely confirmed by our research.
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The history of Marx & Co. and Robaver are particularly enlightening: the former for DNB's (lack of) involvement when it failed in 1922; the latter for the poisonous relationship between the bank and the non-financial firms which it had helped to finance (Colvin, 2014) . Jonker (1991 Jonker ( , 1995 argues that many banks performed badly because they lacked the knowledge and experience to finance industries; he finds that close ties between bankers and their borrowers worsened the crisis. Jonker and Van Zanden (1995) argue that the 1920s taught bankers that management ties carry risks; in the late 1920s, many banks abandoned the very ties that they had earlier established to control their financial interests. The sector as a whole was largely able to avoid banking failures in the Great Depression of the 1930s, due in no small part to crisis-induced consolidation, corporate restructuring and policy changes.
A major source of the economic decline which acted as the backdrop to the Netherlands' 1920s crisis was reduced international demand following a global post-war slump. Consumption statistics suggest that domestic demand remained quite stable, or even increased (Barro and Ursúa, 2008) , and so much of the blame can be put on consumers located in Germany and the UK, the Netherlands' principal export markets. The reason for the Netherlands' post-war problems was therefore largely exogenous. Why was the drop in foreign demand felt so sharply by banks in particular? The Netherlands' interest rate structure (Van der Bie and Smits, 2001) had encouraged firms to finance their rapid war-time demand-led expansion using short-term rather than long-term debt instruments, as the former became relatively cheap (Figure 1 ). The type of project that had traditionally found long-term financing was now being paid for with riskier short-term debt, which 10 This is likely an underestimate of the true damage done: just the 18 banks in our sample which failed outright were valued at 208 million guilders immediately prior to the crisis, approximately 1.2 billion euros in today's money. then had to be rolled over. When, in the early 1920s, these loans were called in en masse, they simply could not be repaid.
The Netherlands' 1920s debt-deflationary crisis is best understood in a British mirror, where the blame for deflation has been put squarely at the door of monetary policy (Solomou, 1996) . The UK's large trade deficit and low gold reserves resulted in the formal abandonment of gold in March 1919. However, the expectation persisted that policymakers would restore pre-war parity as soon as feasible. Although sterling was only officially re-linked to gold in 1925, the damage had already been done in the preparation for this return; expectations did all the work (Solomou, 1996, pp. 39-40) . The Dutch case differs from Britain's in that the country had accrued large balance of payments surpluses during the war, which had led to a significant increase in gold reserves (Boeschoten, 1992) and the overall money supply (DNB, 2000) ( Figure 2 ). The guilder's return to gold was coordinated with that of sterling, and the guilder-sterling exchange rate was fixed throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century. Economic policies had to be coordinated with the hegemon; the decision-making process which led to the deflation was determined on Horse Guards Road and Threadneedle Street, not the Kneuterdijk and the Oude Turfmarkt. Dutch monetary policy, and thus by extension the decision to embrace a deflationary path, was exogenous. 
Data and empirical strategy
The macroeconomic cause of the Dutch crisis is relatively well understood, and so we explore the contribution of decisions made at the level of individual banks. We use discrete choice models to estimate whether pre-crisis bank-level characteristics can predict crisis performance. Formula 1 depicts the discrete choice (logistic) model used:
Distress is defined as a binominal variable that takes the value of one if a bank has experienced distress during the period 1920 to 1927 and zero otherwise. 13 Subsequently ! ! is a vector of bank-specific financial characteristics, !" ! is a vector of bank-specific market structure variables and ! ! is a vector of bank-specific management and interlock characteristics. Moreover, ! ! is the bank-specific prediction error stemming from the choice of regression model and is clustered by region and bank type. 14 Subsequent regressions report marginal effects at the median.
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We use four sources in the construction of the dependent variable, i.e. the measure of distress resolved through liquidation, merger or reorganisation. These sources are: (1) Kramer (1926) , a PhD dissertation on firm reorganisations during the crisis period; (2) De Vries (1989), an official history of DNB in the crisis period, written using the archives of this bank; (3) DNB (2000), a list of all banks operating in the Netherlands throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and (4) news and commentary from the financial press which we compile using an online newspaper database.
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While we find a significant overlap between the four sources, we find source (4) to be particularly useful; unlike the others, it enables us to systematically search for evidence of distress for all 142 banks in our sample, and it allows us to identify those banks that needed to be reorganised financially, but did not exit the market altogether through liquidation or merger. Overall we identify 13 We define three mutually exclusive types of distress: liquidation (including bankruptcy), distressed merger and financial reorganisation. We treat these categories as one because we are interested in predicting the incidence of distress rather than the manner in which the distress is resolved.
14 While the variables chosen in our analysis are generally applicable, there are regional and bank-type differences which may render measurement error particular to specific regions or bank types. To facilitate the identification process we therefore limit the correlation of measurement errors to the specific region and bank type for which they are relevant using a one-way clustering methodology. This results in the use of twelve potential separate clusters, consisting of four region types (Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Groningen, elsewhere in the Netherlands) and three bank types (general, mortgage, shipping banks). As there are no shipping banks located outside of Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland or Groningen, we use 11 clusters. Overall, our clustering methodology leads to conservative estimates of standard errors.
33 banks that suffered distress. beyond the Robaver debacle in 1924, and finally includes the government-backed reorganisation of the middenstandsbanken in 1927 which forever changed expectations about the role of the state in crisis resolution in the Netherlands (Colvin, 2011) . Figure 4 suggests that the recovery of the banking sector began in 1926 for banks that experienced distress, and 1924 for those that did not.
The Van Oss investor manuals bring together balance sheets, profit-and-loss accounts and detailed corporate governance information. Moreover, they include the location of banks'
headquarters, their year of foundation, corporate statement, stock listing and stock prices. Table 1 summarises the relative importance of various balance sheet items in our sample, which constitutes all the financial institutions for which sufficient data were available in Van Oss, and includes the vast majority of banks that were listed on Amsterdam's stock exchange during the period. Our database comprises 142 unique banks, where we distinguish between general (commercial) banks, specialised mortgage banks and shipping banks that specialised in financing international trade. Our financial information is based on the annual reports published by banks and firms themselves, which were used by the compilers of Van Oss in the production of their manuals. In order to facilitate comparative financial ratio analysis, we standardised and converted the accounting information to categories used in modern balance sheets and profit-and-loss accounts, adopting a procedure outlined in the appendix to this article. 20 In the 1910s, Dutch financial accounting practices differed from modern standards. Camfferman and Van den Brand (2010) provide a critical assessment of the usefulness of annual reports for empirical analyses and argue that prudence and 19 We exclude DNB and Javasche Bank from our sample, since they acted as banks of issue for the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies. 20 Appendix Table A1 conservatism induced an undervaluation of assets and, as a consequence, of equity. 21 Many firms and banks had so-called silent or secret reserves. The creation of these reserves was accompanied by an underrepresentation of the profits, which were partially channelled into these reserves. We argue that financial ratios based on the accounting information can be useful in a comparative setting because results will be influenced only by the accounting practices in cases of systematic mis-valuation for particular firms. Camfferman and Van den Brand (2010, pp. 99-110) do not document such systematic effects. Furthermore, we agree with Camfferman and Van den Brand (2010, p. 115 ) that annual report information is a useful source because it describes the way in which directors present their firms to outsiders.
In addition to reporting financial accounting data, Van Oss supplies comprehensive lists of all banks' directors (directeuren and commissarissen). We digitised and cross-referenced these lists with all other banks and non-financial firms for the same fiscal year to map any interlocking directorates.
We use the Financieel Adresboek (1917) , a financial gazetteer, to identify 2,579 locations (headquarters or branches) of financial institutions active in the Netherlands. 22 For the 142 banks in our sample we identify the 350 branch locations. These data are used to map the market structure of the Dutch financial services sector and banks' product market choices in the 11 provinces that constituted the Netherlands at the time.
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Ideally, we would prefer to use information about banks' asset portfolios, including their loans and equity participations, but this information is not available to us. Interlocking directorates instead help us to proxy for these portfolio characteristics. Therefore, we collect information from
Van Oss about 232 non-financial firms quoted on the Amsterdam stock exchange, in addition to the 21 See Zeff, Van der Wel and Camfferman (1992) for a detailed description of the development of financial reporting practices and rules in the Netherlands. 22 We count 1,073 unique bank locations; many financial institutions held more than one branch in one particular location in the Netherlands. 23 We measure competition on the basis that: (1) general banks compete only with other general banks; (2) mortgage banks compete with mortgage banks and general banks; and (3) shipping banks compete only with shipping banks. We found that our results were not sensitive to alternative market definitions.
142 banks in our sample. 24 The board information of the 374 banks and non-financials is used to map the relationships among banks and between banks and other firms based on interlocking directorates.
Consequently we can quantify the effect of interlocks hypothesised by Jonker (1991) by using these firm and bank characteristics (size, leverage and profitability) in conjunction with the interlocks held by banks.
The data described above are used to construct a range of variables which capture different aspects of balance sheet composition and corporate governance characteristics, described in the next section. We pitch these models against one another in a series of binomial regressions in order to arrive at a specification which does the best job of "predicting the past". As standard goodness-of-fit measures do not perform well with binomial regression models (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000) , we adopt an approach popular in the medical literature; we calculate the so-called area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (abbreviated to AUC). 25 This method is used in Taylor (2012) as a means of assessing the predictive ability of his models of global financial crises. Additionally, we use Shapely variance decomposition to explore how much power each variable category (bank characteristics, management structure and interlock characteristics) has in each model specification.
We follow a procedure similar to Grömping (2007) and Shorrocks (2012) in this respect.
Variables and hypotheses
As our core dependent variable indicating distress, we define a dummy variable which equals one if 24 The 232 non-financial corporations are representative of the stock-listed population of non-financial corporations.
Our results are therefore particular to banks that interlock with publicly-listed firms. 25 We calculate the proportion of banks which we predicted to fail and actually did fail, or the proportion of true positives that our models classify as being positive (called the "sensitivity" of the model), and compare this with the proportion of banks which we predicted to survive and did survive, or the proportion of true negatives classified as being negative (called its "specificity"). We plot the sensitivity against the false positive fraction (1 -specificity) for all models in our analysis. The curve in such a graph is called the receiver operating characteristic (ROC). Any model that traces an ROC curve above the 45-degree line has a better predictive ability than a random assignment of observations. The larger the area under the ROC curve (abbreviated to AUC), the better is the predictive ability of the model. Metz (1978) describes the method used here in the context of medical statistics.
and only if a bank experiences and discloses distress in the period 1920 to 1927. We define three mutually exclusive types of distress resolution: liquidation (including bankruptcy), distressed merger and financial reorganisation. 26 Notice that the crisis came in two phases ( Table 2 reports by category concise definitions of all the variables used in the analysis that follows.
Financial variables:
For asset quality, we use the variable size (natural logarithm of total assets) to proxy for the possibility that large banks are less likely to fail because of a broader portfolio of investments, and age (natural logarithm of the difference between the year of foundation and 1917) to proxy for banks' asset selection experience (following Thornhill and Amit, 2003) . For loan book quality, we use the ratio of long-term loans outstanding to total assets (following Martin, 1977; Thomson, 1991) . For earnings sufficiency, we use return on assets and a measure of interest rate dependency (following Kolari et al., 2002) . For liquidity and solvency, we capture the liquidity of banks' assets by constructing a measure of how well banks manage to match the maturity of their assets with the maturity of their financing instruments, a measure of stability popular among contemporaries (Verrijn Stuart, 1921; Klijnveld, 1922; Sternheim, 1925) . Additionally, we posit that banks whose stock was regularly quoted on Amsterdam's official listing were more liquid since investors could sell their stake more easily in times of high volatility (following Kalev et al., 2003) .
To capture the effects of differences in capital structure we use total leverage (debt to total assets) and deposits to total assets (following Zmijewski, 1984) .
Market structure variables:
The nature of the relationship between market structure, competition and bank stability is controversial. A dynamic model of asymmetric information of the 26 We define reorganisations as one or any combination of asset restructuring and debt restructuring. 27 We used alternative specifications of these phases in order to explore the possibility that distress events which became public in 1923 might merely have remained hidden for longer. We find that banks which were seen to be affected by the crisis in 1923 were more likely to: (1) have no interlocking directorates with DNB; and (2) be interlocked with more profitable and bigger non-financials. We conclude that banks which experienced distress in 1923 had more in common with banks which experienced distress after 1923.
type proposed in Keeley (1990) , and used more recently in Allen and Gale (2004) , suggests that there is a trade-off between competition and risk. But models which explore the possibility that bankers have little influence over the riskiness of their customers, such as that of Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) , find the opposite result. Empirical applications to US Depression-era banking markets abound (Calomiris and Mason, 2003; Carlson, 2004; Carlson and Mitchener, 2009 ). We construct three measures that map the degree of competition in the Dutch banking sector. We first define a dummy variable that equals one only if a bank had branches in the Netherlands. Consistent with Calomiris and Mason (2003) and Carlson (2004) , we expect branching to increase the probability of suffering distress due to increased monitoring costs since the branches are farther removed from their headquarters. Second we identify banks that had international activities and posit that they will be more exposed to the macroeconomic shock of the early 1920s and hence face a higher probability of distress. To determine the structure of the banks' product market, we define 11 geographic markets, being the provinces constituting the Netherlands. Then for each bank with presence in a province, we calculate the ratio of the number of locations (headquarters and branches) of the bank and the number of locations of all banks in our extended sample. For each bank we use the average of these ratios over all the regions where a bank is branched. We call this variable relative representation.
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As the literature has no firm conclusion on the competition-stability relationship, we remain agnostic about the influence of this variable.
28 This metric takes into account the number of branches that each bank holds in different provinces and the importance of each of the provinces for each bank. For example, Robaver has 13 branches plus one headquarters, in total 14 locations spread over two provinces. In Noord-Holland the bank has two branches; in Zuid-Holland the bank has 12.
There are 253 other banks and branches active in Noord-Holland. As the branches of a bank do not compete with one another, the bank faces competition from 251 rather than 253 other bank-branch locations. The relative representation of the bank in Noord-Holland is therefore 0.79% (2/251). For Zuid-Holland the bank has a relative representation of 4.25%
(12/300). We weigh these relative representation measures by the number of branches the bank has in each of the two provinces, which yields 1.5% (0.79*2) and 51% (4.25*12) for Noord-Holland and Zuid-Holland. We sum these two and normalize by the number of banks that generates our final indicator of relative representativeness, which yields a value of 3.8% ((1.5% + 51%)/14).
Management structure and characteristics of interlocks:
We introduce managerial influences by looking at the management structure and interlocking directorates of banks and the connectedness of banks and non-financial firms. 29 We define management structure as the board size and the number of interlocking directorates. We expect that management structure variables negatively affect the risk of failure, in line with Darrat et al. (2010) . In much the same way as Dittmann et al. (2010) , we posit that bankers on the boards of other corporations are capital market experts and provide know-how and better access to funds (Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005) , act as monitors (Morck and Nakamura, 1999) , and promote their own business (Booth and Deli, 1999) . Interlocking directorates measure the relative independence of a bank or firm's board, since banks with more interlocks are potentially more powerful in terms of financial and industrial dominance, but may have a higher chance of suffering from possible conflicts of interest for bankers on the board (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001 ).
In addition to the governance roles of interlocks, we use the information as a proxy for banking relations. The economic effects of relationship banking is somewhat ambiguous, in that bank ties allow for information sharing, while they may also create hold-up problems (Braggion and Ongena, 2013) . Indeed, some have gone so far as to argue that relationship banking has no measurable impact on firm financing or stability (Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004) . As an approximation of a bank's portfolio we measure the average across interlocks of asset size, leverage and profitability of all banks and all the non-financials that a bank is related to. 30 We calculate a 29 In the ensuing analysis of interlocking directorates, we treat connections involving either directeuren or commissarissen as identical; we found that separately measuring interlocks involving each tier of banks' management boards did not affect our results and yielded no additional insight. 30 We use balance sheet characteristics of banks or non-financial firms (size, leverage and ROA) and construct a value-weighted average using total assets at the beginning of 1918 for each. The bank characteristics are presented in Table 3 . The median non-financial firm in our sample has three million guilders in assets, financed by 34 per cent of Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to measure the level of the concentration of investments within banks' portfolios. In particular, we measure asset size concentration 31 and industry concentration.
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Additionally we incorporate the external financing demand of industries averaged across interlocks to correct for the financial dependence of industries on the Dutch financial sector (after Rajan and Zingales, 1998) . Quantifying the costs and benefits associated with bank relationships is done by looking at the number and type of interlocks held by each bank. Table 3 summarises the mean values for all variables as specified across the full sample of 142 banks and sub-samples organised by bank type. We find that general commercial banks make up the largest portion in terms of asset size, while mortgage banks dominate in terms of number. Mortgage banks were highly specialised in long-term funds, while general banks held approximately equal totals of short-and long-term loans. We find that general banks were better able than mortgage and shipping banks to match the maturity of their assets with their liabilities and held significantly higher amounts in deposits. Furthermore, general banks interlocked more with non-financial corporations held significantly more directorates than more specialised banks. Table 4 reports the mean and median values of all variables as specified across the full sample of 142 banks, categorised by distress experience during the 1920s. We find that banks which experienced 31 With respect to asset size concentration, we calculate an HHI as the sum of squared portions of each interlock's total assets relative to the sum of total assets of all interlocked banks or non-financials. For example, assume that bank A has interlock-relations with B and C, both with a size of 500 thousand guilders in assets. The total size of the related banks is therefore 1,000 thousand guilders. The index will then be 0.5, or (500/1000) 2 + (500/1000) 2 . Obviously, the concentration index increases when bank A becomes interlocked with additional banks and when the size of bank B or C increases.
Understanding bank distress

A univariate analysis of bank distress, timing and resolution
32 Similarly, we measure industry concentration using an HHI based on share of banks' interlocks in each of the 11 industries listed in Van Oss (industrial; agriculture; mining; oil; rubber; shipping; tobacco; tea; railways; tram transport; and other).
distress during this period were younger, more likely to have a stock listing and held more deposits.
Additionally we find that banks suffered more when they had more branches, were active internationally and had a larger market share. When we separate early (1920 to 1922) from late (1923 to 1927) distress events, we find that: (1) bigger and older banks failed during the second rather than first part of the 1920s, which corroborates the claim made by one contemporary observer (Verrijn Stuart, 1921 ) that larger banks are likely able to weather a crisis for longer; (2) banks which better matched the maturity of their (short-term) assets with that of their (short-term) liabilities were more prone to debt-deflationary shock and subsequently suffered distress earlier; (3) banks which had fewer interlocking directorates experienced distress earlier; (4) banks which had interlocking directorates with large banks were more likely to experience distress during the latter part of the crisis; and (5) banks which had large and concentrated interlocking directorates with non-financial firms failed later in the crisis.
A baseline model of distress
A series of four regressions is reported in Table 5 . We examine the effect of five categories of variable independently and then together. In model (1) we find that bank age has a significant negative effect, which shows that younger banks were more likely to fail. We also find that exchange-listed banks were about 25 per cent more likely to experience distress. This may be driven by the liquidity of the stock and the resulting volatility, consistent with Kalev et al. (2003) ; it may, however, reflect the possibility that unlisted banks were better able to hide their distress.
We find a strong effect for profitability. Profits in 1917 are in our view an indication of the riskiness of the banks' activities, which in good times bring higher earnings, but lead to a backlash under worsened conditions, much in line with Fahlenbrach et al.'s finding (2012) for US banks in the modern era. We find that banks which failed were also more highly valued before the crisis than those that did not; from 1916 to 1919, the stock prices of banks which would go on to experience distress increased by about ten per cent, versus 0.6 per cent for non-distressed banks (see Figure 4 ). This suggests that banks which did best out of the Netherlands' neutrality during the First World War and the short post-war economic boom had most to lose in any ensuing economic reversal. For each percentage increase in leverage, we find that the probability of banks' distress increases by about 50 per cent, showing that lower equity buffers make banks vulnerable to shocks. This is consistent with the argument in Jonker and Van Zanden (1995) that this crisis was debt-deflationary. We control for bank size and long-term loans, but find no significant effects.
In model (2) we add the four variables and find that deposits have a significant positive effect, where each additional percentage of deposits relative to assets increases the probability of failure by about 45 per cent. As is common to many financial crises, banks which relied more heavily on callable deposits rather than other types of financing stood a greater chance of failure. The other three variables show no effects that are statistically significant.
Model (3) introduces our three product market variables. We find that branching has a significantly positive effect, which indicates that banks with branch networks faced significant monitoring problems and increased risk exposure as the branches became more removed from their headquarters. This finding is consistent with Calomiris and Mason (2003) and Carlson (2004) where bank branching induces higher failure rates. We find that banks with international activities were about 20 per cent more likely to experience distress because they were more exposed to pressures exogenous to the Dutch economy. We find no effect of banks' relative representation, our domestic market structure variable. This is a very interesting finding; it suggests that bank distress was driven by the joint effect of the economic shock and strategic choices within banks, rather than any competitive pressures from one another. In model (4) we retain all variables with an absolute t-value above unity and rerun our model. 33 This specification suggests that, after controlling for the product market choices of banks, long-term loans also significantly affect distress probability. 33 This model includes only statistically relevant variables and can therefore be said to be the most parsimonious specification. The statistical power of this model remains unaffected by this choice in terms of pseudo R-squared or AUC.
The reported AUC values demonstrate that our model specifications in Table 5 perform ("predict the past") significantly better than random assignments. We find that measures of asset quality, earnings sufficiency, stock listing and bank capital structure have the largest explanatory power.
The effects of interlocking directorates
Panel A of Table 6 shows the results of logistic regressions with respect to our hypotheses, where:
model specification (5) encapsulates the effect of banks' management structure on the probability of experiencing distress during the 1920s; model (6) focuses on the characteristics of interlocked banks;
model (7) introduces three additional characteristics of interlocked non-banks; and model (8) combines all these effects. Again we omit each variable with a t-value below one or with an obvious correlation with subsequently introduced variables.
Management structure: We find that a bank with a large board stood significantly less chance of experiencing distress; a one per cent increase in board size results in a reduction of distress probability in the range of 12 to 26 per cent. 34 This is somewhat contrary to Simpson and Gleason (1999) , who find that, for publicly listed banks, the size of a bank's board negatively affects costs and efficiency and increases the probability of distress. We suggest that a larger board signifies more "in-house experience" to cope with crisis management.
Characteristics of interlocked banks:
We find that interlocks with large banks reduce the failure risk (by about 6 per cent), while the profitability of these banks has an adverse effect. Our results imply that banks with ties to smaller and more profitable banks were engaging in relations with riskier peers, which negatively affect their survival chances. Together, these results suggest that the mere presence of an interlock does not in itself result in a conflict of interest. Intrinsically, then, 34 The results remain robust after controlling for potential non-linear properties.
interlocking directorates have risk-reducing properties; however these risk properties depend on the corporate characteristics of the interlocks.
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Characteristics of interlocked non-banks: We find that banks that concentrated their interlocks with non-financials were significantly less at risk during the crisis than those banks that held well diversified portfolios. The effect is relatively large as we find that a 1 per cent increase in concentration leads to an increased failure probability of 17 per cent. This result suggests that banks with concentrated interlocks were better able to monitor their interests through their networks.
Using variance decomposition in Panel B of Table 6 we find that banks' financial characteristics explain over 70 per cent of the variation in the probability of their distress.
Additionally we find that the characteristics of interlocks explain approximately 21 per cent of the variation. This is driven by interlocks with banks rather than non-financials. We show that the quality of our model improves by about seven per cent -comparing the AUCs of models (4) and (8) -because we add interlocking characteristics (see Figure 5) . 36 In summary, we find evidence that Jonker (1989 Jonker ( , 1991 was correct but incomplete in believing that interlocks added to the riskiness for banks. We show that Jonker's ideas can be expressed more precisely in terms of the characteristics of interlocked banks and non-financial firms, such as firm size, leverage, profitability and concentration.
Robustness
Tables 7 and 8 report a number of additional results intended to determine whether our findings are robust to alternative model specifications and sample selection biases. Together they suggest that our 35 We find that the effect of return on assets disappears when we take the profitability of interlocked banks into account. This may be due to either: (1) the presence of a competitive advantage which other banks want to benefit from by interlocking with these more profitable banks; or (2) these more profitable banks have superior asset selection and monitoring abilities in terms of selecting firms that are able to meet their bank obligations; or (3) both of these. This being the case, the profitability of a bank is associated with the profitability of its interlocks. 36 For the AUC, a common rule-of-thumb is that values between 0.9 and 1 should be considered outstanding; between 0.8 and 0.9 excellent; and between 0.7 and 0.8 acceptable (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000, pp. 156-164). main results on banks' balance sheet characteristics, management structure and interlocking directorates are not sensitive to the inclusion of additional variables or the use of restricted samples.
Model (9) is for the sub-sample of banks for which sufficient historical data were available to calculate asset growth. We find that asset growth has a non-significant positive effect, while the goodness-of-fit increases and all bank characteristics keep their sign and significance. We find that asset growth shows significant correlation (21 per cent) with the size of interlocked banks, which subsequently becomes (though only marginally) insignificant.
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The results of model (10) are consistent with the idea that sharing a director with a large and influential private bank has risk-reducing properties: one such interlock reduces failure risk by approximately 11 per cent from the median -though this is not statistically significant at standard levels. Model (11) includes a dummy variable that equals one only if some portion of a bank's equity capital remained unpaid. It is included to test the hypothesis that uncalled capital can act as an equity buffer in times of crisis (Turner et al., 2005) . Its inclusion has no discernable impact on our results.
The discrete choice model in our analyses does not take into account the timing of distress.
Potentially, the weakest banks are the first to enter distress, while stronger banks fail at a later stage of the crisis. In order to test for the relevance of the timing of distress we present a Cox proportional hazards model in Table 8 , specifications (12) through (15). 38 We find that our earlier results (in Table   6 ) are consistent with those of the hazards models; the signs and significance of the variables remain stable. Additionally the variance decomposition shows a similar distribution of explanatory power across the variable categories; the majority of the variance is still explained by bank characteristics, followed by the characteristics of interlocked banks. Two expected changes occur when using the hazards models: (1) the size of interlocked banks becomes (marginally) non-significant, which is 37 Accordingly we argue that prior asset growth was industry wide, hence the correlation. 38 The estimation equation of the Cox proportional hazards model is given by!ℎ(!,
is the baseline hazard and ! ! a vector of firm-specific variables concerning bank characteristics, management structure and characteristics of interlocked banks and non-banks. We report marginal effects at the median to keep the findings comparable to earlier results. consistent with our findings, presented in Table 4 , that banks interlocked with large banks are better able to longer withstand the crisis; and (2) our long-term loans variable has become (marginally) non-significant, which is consistent with our findings presented in Table 4 that banks that fail later in the crisis hold more long-term loans.
Conclusion
This article adds to the historiography of the 1920s by systematically measuring the differences between the banks that suffered financial distress in the Netherlands' biggest twentieth-century financial crisis and those that did not. While the root debt-deflationary macroeconomic cause of the 1920s crisis was largely exogenous to the Netherlands, this article shows how factors endogenous to the Dutch financial services sector were crucial in explaining banks' differing fates. Our analysis explains why some banks failed in the 1920s while others survived unscathed, something Jonker and Van Zanden (1995) omit to specify precisely in their analysis. We suggest that debt-deflation's impact depended on banks' balance sheet characteristics and management structure. Decisions made before the deflationary shock were indicative of banks' ensuing probability of survival; their exposure to distress was partly attributable to past policies. We find that younger banks, banks that were stock listed, banks that had high leverage ratios, banks that engaged in branching and international activities, and banks with large quantities of deposits were more at risk during the 1920s.
In particular we find that the characteristics of the financial firms with which a bank shares managerial ties have a high predictive power. Jonker (1989 Jonker ( , 1991 uses the number of interlocking directorates as an indicator of the developmental path of the Dutch banking system. He implies that the Dutch banking sector's retreat from universal banking in the late 1920s is proof that this corporate governance mechanism did not operate well in times of crisis. Our article contributes to Jonker's analysis by exploring the mechanism through which managerial interconnectedness had an impact on banking stability. We provide evidence that it was the characteristics -size and profitability -of the banks rather than the non-financial firms at the other end of interlocks that drove Jonker's hypothesised relationship. As such, we argue that conflicts of interest found in case studies of the crisis (in particular, Colvin, 2014) are best understood as a function of the corporate characteristics of those interlocks.
Balance sheet item which are consistent across all the sampled banks. Assets are divided into: fixed assets, financial assets and current assets; and the equity and liability structure consists of equity capital, provisions and long-and short-term liabilities. Short-term liabilities consist of accounts payable and short-term loans. The difference between equity reserves and provisions is the nature of the reservation. Cases in which the purpose of a reserve was clearly stated have been classified as provisions. In some cases, the item aandeelhouders (shareholders) was found on the left-hand side of the balance sheet. This signalled that there is unpaid equity capital, which the bank could call upon in times of need. This item was subtracted from the balance sheet and the nominal equity capital was lowered accordingly.
The same procedure was followed for all 143 banks in our sample and the 234 non-financial firms that were used in the calculation of the interlock characteristics. 
